Prior to consideration of the Bricker Amendment, the only extensive postwar Senate deliberations on human rights treaties concerned the Genocide Convention. Many of the arguments both for and against the Genocide Convention are specific to it, and therefore these deliberations are not a good source for general arguments against human rights treaties. Nevertheless, the deliberations are important because they marked the emergence of a small but strong group of opponents who, despite the overwhelming support for the Convention from many and varied individuals and organizations, managed to block the treaty.s Even at this early point, opponents did not consider the Genocide Convention to be an isolated problem, but part of a much larger movement-the international recognition and legal codification of individual human rights-which they feared would alter the nature and process of the American political system and the American way of life. The arguments that germinated during the Genocide Convention hearings later blossomed into full-fledged opposition to all human rights treaties.
The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. The first section is an analysis of the Bricker Amendment itself, highlighting the explicit and implicit arguments against human rights treaties. Second, we summarize Senate consideration of the Bricker Amendment. In the third section, we offer a typology of arguments made in the 1950s against ratification of human rights treaties. Fourth, we consider contemporary opposition to the treaties, assessing the stability of arguments over time and the factors now inhibiting passage.
THE BRICKER AMENDMENT
The movement surrounding the proposal, modification, and support of the Bricker Amendment reflected a widespread concern within the American electorate. Garrett identifies two important dimensions of the movement: (1) a "substantive" concern about increasing United States involvement internationally and (2) an "institutional" dismay at the increased power and independence of the executive in foreign affairs.6 If we look closely at the immediate cause of concern, however, we can see that human rights treaties played the most important role in initiating and maintaining the spirited attack on the treaty-making powers. Opposition to the treaties, of course, reflected both substantive and institutional concerns. The substantive concern focused on the notion that human rights fall within a nation's domestic jurisdiction and are not an appropriate subject for treaty-making. The institutional concern revolved around the issue of the distribution of power between the federal government and the states; human rights fall in the domain of "states' rights" and are, therefore, reserved to the states by the tenth amendment to the Constitution. One important point to be made is that, although there are many different reasons why various members of the Senate in the 1950s supported the collection of proposals now subsumed under the general term "Bricker Amendment," concern over the effects of human rights treaties was in the forefront. Senator Bricker himself linked his proposal to his opposition to the human rights treaties and their international implementation:
There is a singleness of purpose of course on the part of all of us ... who have joined in the presentation of this Resolution. ... The American people want to make certain that no treaty or executive agreement will be effective to deny or abridge their fundamental rights. Also, they do not want their basic human rights to be supervised or controlled by international agencies over which they have no control.7
Anti-communist and anti-Soviet feelings also provided motivation for the amendment, and often these two fears were linked. 
Iron Curtain countries would no doubt welcome a new

Section 1
The first section of the Bricker Amendment simply states: "A provision of a treaty which denies or abridges any right enumerated in this Constitution The purpose of this section was to restrain the federal government from further encroaching upon states' rights via the treating-making power. As has already been mentioned, a great concern was the use of these treaties to establish a federal basis for desegregation. This section would have enabled Congress to review all treaties before they would have any domestic application, thereby preventing the federal government from using treaties as a basis for expanding its authority into areas where power is otherwise reserved to the states, under the tenth amendment to the Constitution. This issue arose from one possible interpretation of the Missouri v. Holland decision. The case concerned a treaty between the United States and Great Britain regulating, for conservation purposes, the taking of migratory birds. The state of Missouri challenged the treaty and the implementing legislation on the grounds that it interfered with states' rights and violated the tenth amendment of the Constitution. In upholding the treaty and federal statute, Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that the act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could. .... What is important to remember in assessing these deliberations is that, while supporters of the amendment were reacting against human rights treaties, opponents of the amendment were not arguing in favor of the treaties. Arguments against the Bricker Amendment had little relevance to the debate over human rights treaties, and the defeat of the Bricker Amendment revealed nothing about support for the treaties. Opponents argued, for example, that the amendment would interfere with the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs, significantly alter a constitutional balance of power that had worked well for 160 years, endanger national survival, limit the president's ability to conduct and end a war, impede arrangements for the control of atomic energy and nuclear weapons, and embarrass the president in front of both allies and enemies. 34 Throughout the records of the public debates related to human rights treaties, a single private interest group consistently held a dominant place and deserves special consideration: the American Bar Association (ABA). A study of ABA records reveals that the human rights treaties provided the initial impetus for the formulation of the amendment and a substantial reason for the ABA's strong support of it.37
The ABA has consistently held a special status in the Senate's consideration of the human rights treaties. Its unique position was reflected in numerous statements by Senator Bricker in which he expressed his gratitude to the ABA for their help, including their suggestions on the rewording of the amendment.38 ABA members testifying in favor of the amendment were given special consideration; for example, they were invited by the Chairman of the Subcommittee to sit at his table." Special care was taken to consider their convenience for attending, and they were informed when important witnesses were testifying against the amendment. During the hearings, they frequently questioned other witnesses, a privilege normally reserved to members of the subcommittee. Arrangements were made so that one member could testify after all the opponents had finished their testimony in order to respond to any arguments that had been made.40 And, throughout the deliberations, ABA positions on the amendment and on various treaties were cited by others as authoritative.
A TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST RATIFICATION
Previous sections have examined the arguments against human rights treaties found within the Bricker Amendment itself and within formal congressional deliberations. This section presents a typology of arguments offered in opposition to ratification of human rights treaties in the 1950s. While numerous hearings were held on the Bricker Amendment during this period, the single best source of anti-ratification arguments is the set of hearings held by the Senate Judiciary Committee in February and April of 1953. These were the most extensive hearings and they occurred when Senate support for the amendment was at its strongest. During these hearings, the Eisenhower administration made its commitment not to ratify the human rights treaties. This action made subsequent hearings less fruitful for our purposes, because it reduced the number of references by witnesses to the treaties.
Content analysis of the 1953 hearings (the procedures for which are described in greater detail in the next section) reaffirms the appropriateness of using these hearings to explore arguments against human rights treaties. 
Diminish Basic Rights
The most frequently mentioned arguments against human rights treaties was that the treaties would diminish basic rights. They reflect a lower standard of rights, either intentionally or as a result of inevitable compromises, and citizens of the United States stand to lose rather than gain from ratification of the treaties. The argument rests on the contention that once a human rights treaty is ratified, constitutional protections would be superceded. Ar-thur J. Schweppe, chair of the ABA Committee on Peace and Law through the United Nations, stressed this idea in his testimony: "The limitations in the first amendment with respect to freedom of speech, press, and religion are only limitations on Congress. They are not a limitation on the treatymaking power."41 And Frank Holman, one-time ABA president, presented this argument dramatically: the "internationalists" and the State Department move step by step-first aspirations, then ratification of these aspirations in treaty form, then international courts to enforce the aspirations. Thus our internal rights under our own Constitution, and Bill of Rights, are to be undermined step by step and will continue to be undermined unless the American people shut off this insidious process by an appropriate constitutional amendment.42
Various specific rights which were thought to be endangered, including mostof the rights in the Bill of Rights, were discussed throughout the hearings. He went on to explain that the federal government could accomplish this objective through ratification of the human rights treaties. Deutsch articulated the common concern that the treaties would be used specifically to legitimize federal legislation on racial matters: "and the same instrument has recently been cited with great force as a prohibition of race segregation in the District of Columbia, in Kansas, and in other States."46 A common metaphor for the treaties often heard during the hearings was that of the Trojan Horse. Deutsch explained the metaphor well:
the treaty clause of the Constitution (article VI) [is] as a 'Trojan Horse,' ready to unload its hidden soldiery into our midst, destroying State laws and constitutions and leaving behind the wreckage of the dream of the Founding Fathers which envisioned maintenance of the established constitutional balance between State and Federal power, and preservation of the Bill of Rights intact.47
Some of the specific states' rights which were mentioned during the hearings as being in danger of encroachment were the rights to restrict land sales on the basis of race and national origin, set criminal and civil liabilities, determine the political rights of women, establish qualifications for public school teachers, and regulate membership in the medical and legal professions-which seemed especially unsettling to the testifying ABA members.48
Promote World Government A third argument which was made frequently during the hearings was that human rights treaties constituted a move in the direction of establishing a world government. An ABA memorandum on the amendment was included in the testimony of Vernon Hatch and referred to the issue of world government. 45 other things, is a complete blueprint for socializing the world, including the United States. Article 23 provides that everyone has the right to "just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment" and that everyone has the right to "just and favorable remuneration. .. ." The purpose provided was to liquidate our individual enterprise system.58 Senator Bricker also presented his concern that the treaties would alter our "control over our domestic, social, and economic rights, world medicine, socialized medicine.... I am trying to plug that loophole so that there will be no possibility of it."59 He also addressed the issue by stating: "You know that the American Medical Society is greatly disturbed about the possibility of socialized medicine in this country coming in by the back door of treaties."60
Not only is the treaty power a threat to the States, it is a threat to the very Federal Government itself through the pressures of inter-nationally minded groups who would favor erecting a world government by the treaty route in whose favor
Infringe on Domestic Jurisdiction
The human rights treaties were consistently criticized on the grounds that they infringed upon the United States domestic jurisdiction and violated the domestic jurisdiction clause of the United Nations Charter. Some opponents believed that the treaties involved matters that were essentially domestic and beyond the legitimate reach of an international organization. Holman made this claim in citing a member of the United Nations Human Rights Division:
who stated that what the Commission [on Human Rights] was proposing constituted an intervention in matters "within the domestic jurisdiction" of the member states. And he exposed this whole program which has since been under way in the United Nations, in my opinion not a program of peace at all, but a program for meddling in the affairs of the member states.6' Vol. 10 Deutsch expressed the contention that domestic jurisdiction was threatened by human rights treaties:
With similar suavity, albeit with greater logic, we were assured that section 7 of article II of the Charter of the United Nations gave us added protection against interference by that world organization in our domestic affairs. But today even the opponents of constitutional limitations on treatymaking power can no longer sustain their confidence in understandings and reservations as adequate safeguards against the destructive potentialities of international conventions.62
Create Self-Executing Obligations A further, somewhat technical argument, made primarily by lawyers, was that the treaties were self-executing. Self-executing treaties need no implementing legislation to be effective and can be cited and applied by domestic courts. As we have seen, one provision of the Bricker Amendment was that no treaty would be implemented without congressional legislation. Finch explained this purpose of the amendment. "The purpose of the American Bar Association amendment [is] to make all treaties non-self-executing as internal law and thus require legislation to make them internally effective."63 He also elaborated upon the special problems of the human rights treaties as self-executing.
That is why we had all this discussion about the Treaty on Human Rights. ... The United Nations itself cannot by any declaration or resolution or draft treaty make law within the United States. When they do try to do it, it is through the treaty method because of our peculiar provision of our Constitution. What we are trying to do now is to plug that gap so they cannot do it that way and would be obliged to resort to legislation by the whole Congress."
Increase International Entanglements
Other arguments were generated by antipathy toward the United Nations and United Nations agencies and a fear of foreign entanglements. Non-ABA witnesses were particularly outspoken about their suspicions of the United Nations activities, especially action related to human rights. At the time of the interviews, congressional action on human rights treaties appeared to be extremely unlikely. While still formally pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the treaties were not on the congressional agenda. Supporters of the treaties did not appear to be planning any action to stimulate congressional consideration. They saw little political benefit to be gained in advocating the treaties, and feared the potential political controversy as the latent opposition to the treaties once again became vocal. Supporters were convinced that "if they brought [the treaties] up, they would be filibustered, and there would be efforts to amend them."
One clear finding is that, whatever the influence of the Bricker Amendment, it is not often based on direct knowledge about the Bricker debate. Few of the staff members interviewed were even familiar with the specifics of the debate in the 1950s. Instead, the legacy lies in the near-universal perception that human rights treaties are inherently controversial. As one respondent expressed it, what is "important is the perception of a given treaty . . . everything gets categorized." Anything associated with human rights is viewed as "not immediate, apparently controversial, so we can push it aside." Another staff member indicated that "it was the Bricker Amendment controversy, and the incredible knock-down drag-out fight that Eisenhower had in fighting that off, that I think formed a lot of the basic background."
What would it take to overcome this legacy? Respondents were asked to rank five factors according to their importance in explaining the current situation of the human rights treaties. According to portant factor was the position of the president. Respondents, particularly Republican respondents, perceived that the lack of interest on the part of the Reagan administration was the most important factor in explaining why the Senate had no plans to consider, much less approve, the treaties. Presidential support was viewed as an essential ingredient for passage: "the administration has to be mobilized for the Congress to be mobilized;" "the President would have to be behind them;" "a strong presidency to twist arms is the only way for 
